Beyond the Consent Dilemma in Libertarian Paternalism, a Normative Void by Baujard, Antoinette
Beyond the Consent Dilemma in Libertarian
Paternalism, a Normative Void
Antoinette Baujard
To cite this version:
Antoinette Baujard. Beyond the Consent Dilemma in Libertarian Paternalism, a Normative
Void. Homo Oeconomicus, Accedo Verlag, 2015, 32 (2), pp. 369-373. <halshs-01136393>
HAL Id: halshs-01136393
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01136393
Submitted on 22 Nov 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Homo Oeconomicus 32(2):  301-305  ( 2015) 
© 2015 Accedo Verlagsgesellschaft, München. 
ISBN  978-3-89265-118-5 ISSN 0943-0180 
301 
www.accedoverlag.de 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond the Consent Dilemma in Libertarian 
Paternalism, a Normative Void 
 
Antoinette Baujard  
GATE L-SE (CNRS), Université de Lyon – Université Jean Monnet at Saint-Etienne, 
France.  
(eMail: antoinette.baujard@univ-st-etienne.fr)   
 
 
 
I am convinced by Alain Marciano’s argument (Marciano 2015). He 
remarks that consent to the condition of choice is considered by neo-
classical economics to be an external issue. And although it does remain an 
issue as far as the theory of rational choice is concerned, there too it is not 
unjustified to consider it as an external one. For libertarian paternalism, 
though, it becomes an internal issue as soon as the suppositions of 
rationality and perfect cognitive capacities are dropped. A dilemma 
thereby arises, because libertarian paternalists do not take seriously the 
issues raised by the absence of consent to the condition of choice.  
My comment aims to go beyond merely establishing the consent 
dilemma, and to elaborate the normative stakes of the issue of consent 
more widely. In my view, such elaboration should serve to demonstrate the 
importance of the consent dilemma. Libertarian paternalists claim they are 
helping to make “good decisions;” so let us open the black box of these 
good decisions. 
As no “true preferences” exist for individuals, libertarian paternalists 
consider it legitimate to fill in the blanks and do good to each individual. 
The conditions of choice are therefore intentionally framed by the 
libertarian paternalists in order to nudge people towards their interest. 
According to a prominent illustration, men’s behavior in the urinals of 
Schiphol international airport at Amsterdam may be improved thanks to a 
bee-nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). It is implicit within the libertarian 
paternalist theory that there is no reason to believe that each traveler going 
through Schiphol airport is able to rationally calculate how much he earns 
from a diffuse reduction of detergent use somewhere in the world. It is 
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hard to claim the bee nudges the traveler’s decision in his own interest. 
Nonetheless, the bee nudges agents towards “good decisions” because this 
change in men’s behavior makes the world a better place to live in general. 
Before they realize it, libertarian paternalists end up being the architects of 
choices framed around arriving at “good social decisions,”1 since letting 
people make individual choices, given their limited cognitive capacities, 
would fail to reach the social optimum. This therefore suggests a 
hypothesis: libertarian paternalists do actually think they can make “good 
decisions,” and even aim to make “good social decisions.” 
Implicitly, libertarian paternalists are supposed to follow proper and 
relevant principles regarding good social decisions. This is debatable on at 
least two grounds.  
On the one hand, if such principles were to exist, what guarantees that 
the libertarian paternalists would follow them? Imagine that the latter have 
their own beliefs, preferences, information, values, cognitive capacities 
and rationality limits. And imagine there are some conflicts of interests and 
divergences of views. Libertarian paternalists are hence likely to make 
wrong decisions, and here there is most certainly an agency issue. These 
problems were raised explicitly by Bentham (see, e.g., Bentham 1811: 
142); the agency issue is taken on board in Crawford and Sobel (1982)’s 
seminal paper, and in the huge literature developed after them on adverse 
selection and moral hazard in expertise.  
On the other hand, we may ask, what are the proper and relevant 
principles? What, after all, is a “good” decision? I distinguish three levels 
in this normative issue.  
Firstly, in neo-classical economics, the normative issue is solved by the 
mere assumption of individuals’ sovereignty. This implies a blind trust in 
the value of their preferences. A good decision is a decision that is in the 
individual’s interest. At the collective level, a good decision is therefore 
welfarist, i.e., the only relevant information to assess social welfare is 
individual utilities – or equivalently, individual preferences (see, e.g., Sen 
1977). In libertarian paternalism, and more generally in all theories based 
on limited rationality, including behavioral economics or evolutionary 
game theory, there is no definitive account of what rational choice is. As 
Marciano asserts in his note, there is not even such thing as a true 
preference in libertarian paternalism. Hence, as soon as “true preferences” 
are no longer supposed to exist, an irreducible normative issue emerges. If 
                   
1The rationale for nudges in the libertarian paternalist literature is usually based on 
the link between individuals’ choices and individuals’ interests, although they 
sometimes support their approach as follows: “The most important social goals are 
often best achieved … with gentle nudges” (Sunstein and Thaler 2008). 
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not preferences, what information are we to rely on? What is the basis of 
any judgment? 
Secondly, even the distinction between the concerned individual and the 
libertarian paternalist in business raises a problem of the proper definition 
of the proper notion of good for the individual. What is in the individual’s 
interest and how could a libertarian paternalist come to identify it? Even if 
the principal–agent problem described above is put aside, a perfectly 
benevolent libertarian paternalist should measure the individual’s well-
being. But there is an issue here. There are a significant number of 
potential notions of well-being (see, e.g., Sen 1980-81). Each of them 
belongs to one of the various theories of moral and political philosophy, 
e.g., subjective preferences, informed and well-laundered ethical 
preferences, primary goods, declared happiness, capabilities à la 
Nussbaum, opportunities, etc. 
Valuing subjective preferences is a possible conception, or at least it is 
a choice which can be debated (see, e.g. Sen 1979a, b); but let us agree on 
the fact that at least it is consistent with the remaining rational choice 
theory. In libertarian paternalism, as we have just discussed above, valuing 
preferences is not even an option, since they do not exist per se. The 
libertarian paternalist will need to select one of the various well-being 
theories, even though no consistency argument may now be available on 
the basis of which to make one’s choice. It is still an essentially normative 
choice, full of consequences for individuals. And I wonder why individuals 
themselves should not be involved in such a choice. 
Thirdly, when libertarian paternalists end up contributing to the social 
good, they face an aggregation issue, which is not an innocuous exercise – 
to put it mildly. Let us now suppose there is no principal–agent problem. 
Let us suppose that the notion of individual welfare has been properly 
chosen, whatever this means. Let us also suppose that each individual’s 
welfare has been concretely and properly measured. The individuals who 
are concerned by the policy to be established by libertarian paternalists are 
numerous. Meanwhile, the latter must face up to the various measures of 
individual well-being, and must aggregate them into one value of social 
welfare. Social choice theorists have long known that, without explicit 
normative views, this is a vain attempt. Libertarian paternalists, whether 
they wish it or not, will again be choosing among the numerous theories of 
aggregation, including sum, prioritarianism, etc. Again, I wonder why 
individuals should not be involved in such choices. 
I fear that these three issues have not been considered as such by 
libertarian paternalists. Paternalists do as if they knew what is good, and 
do not wonder about the views of the people concerned. Paternalism is an 
issue according to the Kantian tradition because it conflicts with a 
principle of equal respect of persons, in the sense that persons should be 
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treated as ends in themselves (see, e.g., Dworkin 2014). I claim that 
persons are hardly being considered as ends by those who design public 
policy when the latter do not ask about their consent, and do not involve 
them in the decision process. In the presentation I have made, these 
individuals are the mere containers of some well-being, where this notion 
is selected by libertarian paternalists without the individuals’ consent. 
Ultimately, individuals on this view are not ends but containers. As a 
consequence, libertarian paternalists do not do better than paternalists in 
this regard: they do not respect individuals’ consent about the way their 
interest should be defined, valued, or weighted. The absence of consent 
amounts to treating concerned individuals and libertarian paternalists 
differently, and hence leads to a violation of the principle of equal 
treatment of persons. Libertarian paternalists are merely paternalists, after 
all.  
This comment aimed to shift the focus from the absence of consent by 
concerned individuals to what fills in the absence, i.e., the specific 
intentional framing of choices by libertarian paternalists. The absence of 
consent to the conditions of choice indeed raises an essential normative 
issue. I have shown that there exists a hidden social preference within 
libertarian paternalism, and that there is an implicit assumption at work in 
libertarian paternalist, although this is questionable on different grounds. I 
submit that this clearly stands in need of debate. Ultimately, there is a 
normative void in libertarian paternalism, and this normative void raises 
another issue concerning the violation of the principle of equal respect of 
persons. Why is the legitimacy of the normative view of libertarian 
paternalists never questioned? 
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